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The Technostructure, Forty-Six Years Later
Harold Demsetzt
The New Industrial State. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, 1967. Pp. vii-xi, 427. $6.95.
In evaluating contributions to social thought and scientific achieve-
ment there is a strong tendency to overrate originality and novelty and
underrate superior salesmanship. Which had the greater impact on
world events, Das Capital or The Communist Manifesto? Did Gobi-
neau, Nietzsche and Chamberlain, or Adolph Hitler generate greater
enthusiasm for racism? Did Christ or Saint Paul have the greater in-
fluence on the course of world history? And so, when I claim that the
major themes of Galbraith's The New Industrial State lack originality,
I do not thereby impugn the importance of Galbraith's work. Gal-
braith's great strength is his ability to rally popular support for ideas
not now popular. He is a salesman par excellence. The New Industrial
State shows no signs of a failure in his powers to persuade or his ability
to coin a phrase.
That Galbraith's work cannot lay great claim to freshness and novelty
of thought is readily apparent. Economic determinism as strong as that
offered by Galbraith is old hat. The munition maker, cast by Galbraith
in the role of the technologist, plays the part assigned to him by Nine.
teenth Century novelists. Government as the handmaiden of industry
dates back at least to Marx or, although Galbraith might wish to dis.
avow this predecessor, Adam Smith. Chapters 16 and 17, in which the
role of prices in the industrial system is discussed, reflect strongly the
impact of Schumpeter. And there is a marked resemblance between the
treatments given the capitalist, entrepreneur, and technostructure by
Galbraith and those accorded to them by Veblen.
In 1921, Thorstein Veblen, in his The Engineers and the Price Sys.
tem, wrote:
t Professor of Business Economics, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago;
B.A. University of Illinois; M.B.A., Ph.D. Northwestern University.
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... the growth and conduct of this industrial system presents this
singular outcome. The technology... which takes effect in this me-
chanical industry is in an eminent sense a joint stock of knowledge.
... It requires the use of trained and instructed workmen-born,
bred, trained, and instructed at the cost of the people at large. So
also it requires... a corps of highly trained and specially gifted ex-
perts .... These expert men, technologists, engineers, or whatever
name may best suit them, make up the indispensable General Staff
of the industrial system; and without their immediate and unre-
mitting guidance... the industrial system will not work .... To
do their work as it should be done these men of the industrial gen-
eral staff must have a free hand, unhampered by commercial con-
siderations ... nor are they in any degree benefited by any supervi-
sion or interference from the side of the owners.'
In 1967, John K. Galbraith, in The New Industrial State, writes:
The modem large corporation is adapted to the needs of advanced
technology and the large amounts of capital and comprehensive
planning which this requires. It reflects the need of its technostruc-
ture for freedom from outside interference. It wins this freedom
in various ways including the provision to itself of its own supply
of capital.2
Qualified manpower is decisive for the success of the industrial sys-
tem. The education on which it depends is provided mostly in the
public sector of the economy.3
The similarity between these two works goes yet deeper. The roles of
ownership and entrepreneurship in modem society and the nature of
factors of production, in particular, are viewed in highly similar ways.4
1. T. VBLEN, Tm ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYsMrt 68-70 (1921).
2. J. K. GALBRAIT, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 86 (1967).
3. Id. at 296.
4. T. VEBLmN, supra note 1, at 27-28, 79:
Seen in the light of later events this threefold plan of coordinate factors in production
[land, labor, and capital] is notable for what it omits. It assigns no productive effect
to the industrial arts.. . . The state of industrial art is a joint stock of knowledge.
[O]wing to the peculiar technological character of this industrial system, with its
specalized, standardized, mechanical, and highly technical interlocking process of
production, there has gradually come into being this corps of technological produc-
tion specialists into whose keeping the due function of the industrial s)stem has
now drifted by force of circumstance.
J. K. GA.BRArfH, supra note 2, at 58-59, 77:
Power has, in fact, passed to what anyone in search of novelty might be justified in
calling a new factor of production. This is the association of men of diverse technical
knowledge, experience or other talent which modern industrial technology and
planning require.
In part this [shift in power] has been accomplished by the simple attrition of the
stockholder's power ....
803
The Yale Law Journal
But where Veblen sees the imperatives of technology as relatively new
and potential, Galbraith sees them upon us in full force. The coming
change held great promise to Veblen, for in his view, since the technol-
ogists were not motivated by profits, they could be expected to elimi-
nate waste through an expansion of output. For Galbraith, the techno-
structure also is motivated by considerations other than profit, but in
his view the result is waste in the form of overproduction.
If The New Industrial State, however, is judged by the persuasive-
ness of Galbraith's treatment rather than by its originality, there is lit-
tle doubt that the typical reader, who will read it through once, will be
convinced that his 6.95 was a good investment in acquiring knowledge
about his society. Yet if each chapter is reread with an eye to the com-
pleteness of the argument and the evidence upon which it is based, a
reader must feel increasing doubt and dissatisfaction, as I did, and, fi-
nally, must become aware of serious deficiencies in Galbraith's argu-
ments. I shall consider some of these now, deferring until later a discus-
sion of the major outline of The New Industrial State.
The first defects one notices are minor-the author's penchant for
overstatement and the frequency of error in the few facts he provides
to the reader. In this vein, the reader will note the following: Galbraith
would have us all believe that giant corporations produce half of all
goodp and services; one-fourth is closer to the truth. He asserts that cor-
porations have no need to resort to outside financing; in fact consider-
4ble sums are raised through capital markets by corporations (approxi-
mately one-third of all corporate financing). Interest rates tend to be
stable, according to Galbraith; interest rates on Treasury bills plunged
from over 5.5 per cent in the summer of 1966 to below 3.5 per cent in
the spring of 1967, and they now stand over 5 per cent; and long-term
rates have more than doubled since World War II,
The reader will next note Galbraith's unwillingness to state his prop-
ositions tightly and to scrutinize them for possible inconsistencies.
It will now be clear what accords power to a factor of production
- or to those who own or control it. Power goes to the factor which is
hardest to obtain or hardest to replace. In precise language it ad-
heres to the one that has the greatest inelasticity of supply at the
margin. This inelasticity may be the result of a natural shortage,
or an effective control over supply by some human agency, or
bothY
Galbraith claims preciseness, but surely he cannot mean what he says.
5. J. K. GALBaArrH, supra note 2, at 56.
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It is exceedingly difficult to acquire high grade diamonds but that fact
in itself conveys no great power to diamond owners. We thus have one
exception to his proposition. Factors that are unimportant in the total
expenditure pattern of society do not convey power to their owners
even though these factors are inelastic in supply. Secondly, if the supply
of an important factor is not controlled monopolistically, ow-mership
conveys no economic power. Thirdly, the logical and factual jump from
economic to broader social and political power covers no small distance.
Lest the reader think that I am being hypercritical, let him attempt to
reconcile the above principle with Galbraith's contention that:
The eminence of capital is a relatively recent matter; until about
two centuries ago no perceptive man would have doubted that
power was decisively associated with land.0
Presumably capital was more scarce and possibly more inelastic in sup-
ply than was land, at least earlier than two centuries ago; according to
the principle offered to us, it would seem that capital ownership and
not land ownership would have led to power. Yet, in the above quota-
tion, Galbraith claims that any perceptive man can see that power
rested in land ownership. The real difficulty with Galbraith's principle
is that it is completely nonoperational; i.e., it is difficult to conceive of ;
state of the world which would lead most observers either to accept or
reject the principle.
Similar looseness and inconsistency can be found in Galbraith's
treatment of the behavior of the technostructure. One strand of this
treatment is Professor William J. Baumol's belief that corporate man-
agements, after earning a minimum necessary profit rate, proceed to
give up or trade off higher rates in order to expand dollar sales. This
can be rationalized by a belief that shareholders would have received
the larger profits and not management. Management, therefore, is pre-
pared to trade these profits for the nonpecuniary advantages that it sees
accruing to itself from a larger sales volume.
I shall not pause to criticize this hypothesis. Instead, I wish to call at-
tention to an unnoticed major inconsistency introduced by Galbraith
when he adds a second strand to his description of corporate manage-
ment. The second strand asserts that corporate management, through
its unrestricted use of retained earnings, has escaped the discipline of
the capital markets. If this second assertion is correct, it is no longer
true that larger profits need to be paid to shareholders, and it is no
6. Id. 51.
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longer clear why management should forego the use of these profits in
furthering the growth of the firm into new product lines and research
endeavors. Galbraith should resolve this inconsistency but he does not
seem to have noticed it. Profit maximizing behavior in the absence of
payouts to shareholders will maximize the resources over which man-
agement has command.
The reader's attention might next be drawn to the general absence of
evidence. In Chapter 30, for example, Galbraith argues that art and aes-
thetics are slighted in modern industrial society. This is, in large part, a
matter of statistical evidence, although tastes undoubtedly play a role.
No evidence is provided the reader, yet much is available. In 1960,
there were fewer than a half dozen important civic arts centers in ma-
jor U.S. cities. Six years later, the number had increased 100 per cent,
and some 30 new centers were reported to be in the planning or con-
struction stages in cities of various sizes. Museums in the U.S. recorded
more than 300 million admissions during 1965, an increase of about
150 per cent over the last decade. Record sales have tripled during the
last ten years. I cite these facts merely to show the abundance of evi-
dence and not necessarily to argue that Galbraith is wrong, although
art in this country probably occupies a position of prominence today
that is unequalled in the past. However, it must be noted for later ref-
erence that recent studies have shown that audiences for theater, opera,
music, and dance are drawn primarily from narrow segments of the
American population, mainly from professional persons.
Galbraith's discussion of art again reveals his failure to note evidence
that is inconsistent with his assertions. The industrial system, Galbraith
argues, generally ignores or holds unimportant the services of the state
which are not closely related to the system's needs. Included among
these are the artistic and aesthetic qualities of life. These are neglected
by the state in deference to those things, such as highways and technical
education, that are needed by the technostructure. More confidence
could be placed in Galbraith's views if he attempted to reconcile them
with easily obtained evidence that many European governments, espe.
cially in nations where the technostructure is highly developed, grant
considerable subsidies to the arts.
Galbraith's ' evidence is so exclusively by way of example that the
reader will find it difficult to accept the offhanded way in which Gal-
braith rejects counter examples. For example, in arguing that the tech-
nostructure accomplishes highly successful planning, Galbraith admon-
ishes critics that to cite a failure of plans, as in the case of the Edsel
automobile, is not to disprove his argument. By the same token, Gal-
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braith cannot expect his readers to believe that he has proved his case
merely be citing an example or two of his own. In fact, Galbraith takes
no notice of many other product failures in the automobile industry,
including the "'pregnant" Buick, the Corvair, and the De Soto, not to
mention the Kaiser.
These criticisms so far skirt the main battle lines drawn by Galbraith.
But as Galbraith avows several times that truth is not aided by exagger-
ation, it must also be pointed out that neither is error. The accumu-
lated impact of the defects that have been noted is to generate doubts
about the efficacy of his entire thesis. These doubts are verified by an
examination, to which we now turn, of the broader outlines of his dis-
cussion.
The primary goals of the technostructure of a firm are to survive and
to grow. Survival is achieved by earning that minimum of profits re-
quired to keep stockholders contented and to eliminate the necessity
for going into the capital markets to finance growth. This objective,
once achieved, allows the technostructure of a firm to enjoy the auton-
omy of control that Galbraith identifies with survival. Beyond this, the
technostructure of a firm is interested in growth (measured in sales).
In achieving this growth, the technostructure is able to plan the
prices and quantities of its output without interference from free-willed
consumers. This is accomplished primarily by Madison Avenue. The
path is thus cleared for Galbraith to claim that there is built into the
system an overemphasis on industrial growth arising from the desire for
growth in sales coupled with the ability of the technostructure to con-
vince buyers to purchase more. The abrogation of consumer sovereignty
in the industrial sector leads to the neglect of important needs, primar-
ily of an aesthetic sort. These are neglected because they do not fit well
the technology or growth requirements that dictate the technostruc-
ture's needs. Art and beauty are in short supply and toil is in excess sup-
ply. The first line of attack in Galbraith's thesis, then, is the demise of
consumer sovereignty and the creation of an imbalance in modern life
unfavorable to leisure and art.
The second line of attack emphasizes the role of government. When
aggregate demand proves insufficient, the government must step in to
aid the growth plans of the technostructure. The maintenance of aggre-
gate demand, in Galbraith's view, requires that the government always
spend large sums, allowing fluctuations in tax receipts to modify the net
impact of this spending on the economy. In high employment periods,
high tax receipts will offset the inflationary pressures brought about by
large government spending. In low employment periods, tax revenues
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Will fall, ths eic6uraging private spending, while large government
spedding continues.
After discussing the need for large government spending, Galbraith
wishes to convihce the reader that this spending, which he considers
necessary to maintain employment, should be redirected toward im.
pir0Ving the aesthetic qualities of life. That these qualities are neglected
follows from Galbraith's earlier discussions of the demise of the market-
place and the overemphasis given to the output of the industrial system.
But h convincing demonstration of the need for redirecting government
spending requires the construction of one more breastwork: the put-
poselessness of cold war military expenditures. The procedure for con-
structing this redoubt follows the pattern already set. In the view of the
inew economic determinism, cold war expenditures, in large part, exist
to serve the needs of the technostructure, and the cold war itself is in
significant degree a fantasy image maintained subtly by the technostruc-
ture.
The needs of the technostructure are best served by military expendi-
tures because these require more complicated planning than other types
of expenditures, and, therefore, they lend themselves well to the talent
of the technostructure; as a result, the technostructure will play an ac-
tive role in the decisions made by the Department of Defense. This fur-
ther eases the planning problems of the technostructure and leads to a
preference by the technostructure for military spending. Galbraith then
concludes by appealing to the "educational and scientific estate" to join
in a political crusade to end the cold war and redirect government
spending toward furthering the aesthetic qualities of life.
In Galbiaith's logical structure, virtually no attention is given to the
problems created for his schema by the rivalry among firns, all of which
seek to maximize growth, for the consumer's dollar. One industry must
compete with another, and so must firms within an industry. Even if
we assume for the sake of argument, as Galbraith does, the absence of
price competition within an industry, we cannot also grant that there is
no rivalry in advertising and product development or interindustry
ptice behavior.
Galbraith writes as though the business world is single-minded in its
desire to increase the output of goods. But it is extremely heterogefneous
in objective. Banks arid other savings institutions, some of them very
large corporatioins, promote thrift in their rivalry for savings. Evei the
federal government joins this rivalry with promotional campaigns to
sell its debt instruments. This diversity of interest, when combined
with rivalry in the marketplace, must yield doubts about the alleged
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overemphasis on purchasing goods. There are numerous and powerful
economic forces that compete with attempts to get consumers to buy
more goods out of their incomes.
Once Galbraith's view of a monolithic business world is challenged,
it becomes apparent that considerable market forces also exist to fur-
ther leisure and the aesthetic qualities of life. Who can claim that the
promotional campaigns of travel agencies, hotels, airlines, and makers
of boats and camping equipment have not whetted his appetite for
more leisure time? And the large record companies and the art and
book clubs surely promote aesthetics.
Firms must meet the test of rivalry in the marketplace. Not all can
grow as rapidly as their separate technostructure would desire. And, in
this rivalry, savings, art, and leisure, to which large industries cater, are
not neglected.
Galbraith's attack on economics for taking consumer wants as given
reveals his belief that market-oriented wants should be discredited. In
economics, according to Galbraith:
since an individual's satisfaction from his various opportunities for
expenditure is his own, there must be no interference with this
equalizing process. Dictation from any second person on how to
distribute income, however meritorious, will not reflect the pecu-
liar enjoyment pattern of the person in question....
Such is the established doctrine. And if the individual's wants
are subject to management this is interference....
It is true that the consumer may still imagine that his actions re-
spond to his own view of his satisfactions. But this is superficial and
proximate, the result of illusions created in connection with the
management of his wants. Only those wishing to evade the reality
will be satisfied with such a simplistic explanation.... 7
There are two senses in which economists take individual wants as
given. As economists they make no value judgments about these wants.
They do not, as scientists, question the "goodness" or "badness" of
wants any more than a physicist questions the goodness or badness of
friction. It is impossible to conduct scientific analysis if wants are not
treated thus. Secondly, neither economists nor behavioral scientists nor
yet Galbraith has developed a usable general theory of wants. Until
such a.theory is developed, economists must take wants as unexplained
givens. If and when a theory of wants is developed, they will be fair
game for inclusion in scientific work as variables to be explained.
7. Id. 214-15.
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But even with such a theory, an economist will not be able to moral-
ize. Wants still will remain beyond the pale of a scientific evaluation of
their goodness or badness. The inability of science to make such value
judgments is an attribute of science and not of the phenomena with
which science deals.
Galbraith's attack on economics creates confusion between the scien-
tific sense in which wants are taken as given (it makes no difference
whatsoever whether we know that these wants stem from hidden per-
suaders, hunger, or mother's breast) and the normative sense, in which
wants are judged to be moral or immoral. What economist, in his role
as scientist, ever said that wants are natural and inborn? As an econo-
mist, he couldn't care less. What anthropologist supports Galbraith's
naive view that in less affluent societies wants are natural and inborn?
The formation of wants is a complex process. No doubt wants are
modified by Madison Avenue. They also are modified by Washington,
by university faculties, and by churches. And it is not at all clear to this
reviewer that Madison Avenue has the advantage when it comes to false
claims and exaggeration.
The Administration in Washington is immune to legal attack for
promotional distortions when it asserts that this program or that tax
measure is indispensable to the welfare, security, and progress of this
country. And academic freedom protects large numbers of professorial
promoters in the nation's educational institutions; how often in the
classroom have we asserted or heard asserted, without any evidence and
with precious little thought, that this theory and these positions yield
those public policies which in turn will surely improve the lot of the
common man.
Imagine business firms and peddlers promoting an elixir guaranteed
to exorcise the devil and to give to its user eternal life. The FTC surely
would tar and feather the poor fellows, even if they truly believed in
their product; the FTC undoubtedly would be joined, perhaps blessed,
in this crusade by the various churches throughout the land, who, pro.
tected by the laws of the land, promote their own formulas for salvation
at least once each week.
No, it is not at all clear that our social system discriminates in favor
of promotion in the marketplace. Indeed, a correction of the present le-
gal discrimination would seem to require that Washington, city hall,
the university, and the church should be subjected to the same censor-
ship as the business community or, alternatively, that the burden of
censorship should be removed from the business community. It might
even be argued that this legal discrimination results in an imbalance in
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this nation's output of goods and services that unduly favors much too
large an outpouring of goods and services from the public and religious
sectors.
Now to the role of government in Galbraith's analysis. He cannot
reasonably be criticized in these times for being so conventional in his
acceptance of the Keynesian view. This view of government's role in
maintaining aggregate demand has the support of many economists, and
perhaps Galbraith should not be required to present to the reader a
strong dissenting view on these issues. But it is necessary for a reviewer
to point out the existence of such dissent. Not all economists are devo-
tees of Keynes; and even many who are doubt the efficacy and necessity
of assigning to government a Keynesian role. The alternative offered by
these economists is intelligent control over the nation's money supply,
and some argue that fiscal measures are largely impotent unless they re-
flect changes in the money supply. In their view, the nexus between full
employment and government spending is elastic and unreliable.
That firms aid and persuade the Defense Department cannot be dis-
puted. But this is not peculiar to the defense industries. Any seller of
goods attempts to persuade (which does not mean defraud) buyers. And
I am fairly sure that I know of at least one professor and several univer-
sities who will be actively engaged in just such activities when the gov-
ernment turns to improving the aesthetic side of life. After all, what
does the government know about aesthetics? No doubt, these advisors
to the government will be organized into some group, such as Ameri-
cans for Democratic Aesthetics; when they hold their first victory party,
the last and most important toast should surely be to the poor. For it is
they who will have been coerced into paying the taxes for the beauty
and leisure which will be enjoyed, in the main, by Galbraith's Educa-
tional and Scientific Estate. Just as the poor contribute taxes for provid-
ing higher public education that are out of proportion to the small use
they make of state colleges and universities, so they will purchase aes-
thetics for their more wealthy fellow citizens. But no matter. The poor
would otherwise have been persuaded to "waste" their earnings in the
marketplace.
From persuasion and aid in defense decision-making to improving
the planning capability of the technostructure is, at best, an uncertain
step. It simply is untrue, Galbraith notwithstanding, that firms cannot
suffer losses or have plans frustrated when they do business with the De-
fense Department. Again Galbraith ignores the importance of rivalry.
Not all firms seeking to win contracts in fact manage to win them. Not
all firms win acceptance of the weapon system they propose. The air-
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craft industry was bitterly disappointed by the decision to forego
manned bombers for missiles. The struggle over that decision continues
to this day. Boeing's plans hardly were furthered, its costs hardly were
covered, by McNamara's decision to award the TFX contract to Gen-
eral Dynamics. The decision to bypass additional nuclear carriers in fa.
vor of conventional types certainly displeased some of the Navy's sup.
pliers. The decision to do without an anti-missile missile system (re.
cently modified slightly as a result of Russia's decision to install such a
system) was not calculated to further the plans of the technostructure.
Just as a decision to build more beauty into highways and public
buildings will disappoint those who would like to see more subsidiza.
tiori of local theater, there can be no decision of the Defense Depart-
ment that does not impair the planning of some contestant in the ri.
valry for defense business. Not only is there rivalry among suppliers to
the Department of Defense, but these firms must compete with those
who cater to other governmental programs. And this competition is not
insignificant. These other programs have used more federal funds than
have defense expenditures in every year since 1960.
There is much wishful thinking and little depth of thought in Gal-
braith's discussion of cold war problems, He is inclined to believe that
although the cold war has "historic" origins in the Stalinl era, it persists
primarily because of imagery on both sides inculcated largely by the
technostructure of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The China problem and
the Russian refusal to agree to inspection he shunts aside, leaving the
former to a footnote and omitting the latter. And he leans heavily to.
ward the view that the risks of a nuclear accident outweigh the risks of
disarmament, which he equates with the risk that Russia might trick us.
The problem of disarmament is treated in such cavalier fashion that
one doubts he has really given it much thought. His discussion points
to the mutual interest that arises on both sides because the arms race
largely cancels out and may, if not ended, result in a catastrophic acci.
dent.
Many of us are overly optimistic about the ease with which the cold
war can be ended and disarmament pursued. The nuclear deterrent is
viewed, by way of ccident or escalation, as the prime threat to civiliza-
tion, and trickery is considered the main risk of disarmament. We for-
get to ask how likely is a third world war if the deterrent is destroyed
and how soon thdt war would escalate into a nuclear affair. Galbraith
shares the conventional view about nuclear arms. They are evil and
should be destroyed quickly:
It is not clear why agreements can be negotiated in good faith with
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the Communists on all subjects except disarmament. To eliminate
civilized life for all time in response to a short-run calculation that
liberty might otherwise be endangered is also irrational.8
The path to salvation for the two great industrial systems is now
clear. Whether it will be followed is less certain. There must be
agreement on arresting and eliminating the competition in lethal
technology. On this, the survival of both the industrial and the
nonindustrial populations of the world plausibly depends. It is of
prime importance to this effort that it be realized how much of past
action has been based not on reality but on imagery and the
sources of the latter.... Discussion of disarmament must now re-
sult in action. It can no longer serve, as now, as the surrogate for
action.9
1 cannot be so optimistic about the possibilities for disarmament and an
end to the cold war. More convincing and thoughtful arguments are
called for than those that have been offered by Galbraith and by others.
The rapidity with which wishful thinking is converted to conviction
is truly amazing. Many intellectuals, especially the young, believe that
the desire for peaceful coexistence is a fact. Should these issues be
judged on the basis of this year's press releases and crop of visiting
scholars? Is a distorted view of the truth conveyed by going back 20
years to the ancient history of Eastern Europe's incorporation into the
Russian Empire? If so, the invasion of Korea took place only 17 years
ago. The attempt to convert Cuba into a missile base occurred only
four years ago. How easily we forget the Russian violation of the mora-
torium on above-ground nuclear testing. Many thoughtful people feel
that Viet Nam marks another episode in the exuberant messianic psy-
chology of Communism (or of Capitalism). The "historic" origins of
the cold War, it seems to me, are current events. And the hairbreadth
legal distinction employed by the Russians in claiming that their re-
cently announced FOBS is within the letter of our agreement to ban
nuclear satellite systems should not go unnoticed.
Everyone of sane mind wishes that cold war problems did not exist.
Those who desire a general reduction in our government's size and op-
erations, and I include myself in this group, would be doubly pleased if
the cold war did not exist. The most likely first step in this direction, in
the view of many intellectuals, including Galbraith, is disarmament.
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wishful thinking. Realism requires that we recognize Russia's fear of
China and Germany. It is virtually impossible for Russia to disarm its
nuclear forces in the face of what it feels are serious threats, for it is in
this category of military force that Russia holds a clear advantage over
her neighbors.
Moreover, disarmament is a misnomer. It really means a return to
nonnuclear military forces. Vast conventional forces of this type, espe-
dally in the U.S.S.R. and China because of the need to police the empire
and each other, cannot practically be included in any general disarma-
ment agreement. It is important to recognize that a move to conven-
tional forces, accompanied by a general withdrawal of United States
forces from Europe, does not leave the balance of deterrence unaffected.
Should negotiation accomplish such an arrangement, we must, I think,
revise upward the probability that Germany, at least, will be unified
within the Soviet empire. Who would or could stop a quick military
move by the Communists? Will France and England have the will to
resist quickly? Will the United States, once extricated, be willing and
able to move fast enough to prevent such an occurrence? And even if
the Western world does move quickly, might it not be the beginning of
World War III? Once engaged militarily on a large scale, no one can
count on his enemy foregoing the construction and deployment of nu-
clear forces.
Will the Communist world refuse to give serious consideration to the
absorption of West Germany? General disarmament and withdrawal
puts us back approximately to the immediate post-World War II pe-
riod. At that time Russia did not hesitate to move westward even
though the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic weapons.
The problem raised by disarmament is not merely the choice be-
tween accidental nuclear war and Russian trickery. It is a choice between
a misinterpreted accident in the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent
and an increased probability of a third conventional global war that
might escalate into a nuclear holocaust.
Let us now take an overview of The New Industrial State-an econ-
omy in which firms are able to circumvent the market by virtue of their
control over consumers, the overemphasis of industrial output that re-
sults, the necessity for large government expenditures to be military.
The pattern is complete and purposeful. But the tapestry is thin and
dreamlike in quality. The embroidery is clever prose, not careful think-
ing or patient gathering of evidence. The design is to persuade people
who have not seriously thought about these problems. For those who
have, the book holds few surprises.
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But we miss the mark if we fix our attention only on the many logi-
cal leaps, the many errors of omission, the looseness of the entire struc-
ture, and the lack of systematic evidence. The more fundamental aim
of the book is to persuade the reader to accept a view of political phi-
losophy. That view is the desirability of an expansion of control by gov-
ernment over the voluntary arrangements made by its citizens. The ra-
tionale for such an expansion of control is the alleged manufacture of
needless wants by the technostructure. In Galbraith's political philoso-
phy, these wants should be discounted. If we are to understand the
wider political issue, it is necessary to perceive a subtle but important
idea that pervades Galbraith's work though it is never discussed explic-
itly: the impossibility of meaningful freedom.
The persuaders of the industrial structure are so successful, in Gal-
braith's view, that significant decisions by consumers and legislatures
are determined by the economic requirements of the technostructure.
These in turn are determined by the methods of modern production.
Freedom has little meaning in this view of the world. It is a legacy from
a bygone age, from a time when technology was simpler and people
hungrier. It is out of place in a world captured by the technology of the
modem affluent society. This theme runs through the entire work.
Wants are not inborn, natural, or indigenous to men living in the
modem industrial state. Men are persuaded of their wants, both in
their individual behavior and in the collective behavior of their govern-
ment. In Galbraith's political philosophy such men can hardly claim
they are free.
What is freedom? Surely it is not the right to exercise only inborn,
natural wants. It cannot mean that we are limited in our options to se-
lect between breathing, crying, and dirtying diapers. Surely few can
doubt that most of men's wants and beliefs are learned. Freedom must
involve the right to choose between the offerings of those who wish us
to learn one thing and those who wish us to accept alternatives. The
free society keeps open the avenues of persuasion, and it invites its citi-
zens to walk along these paths in an attempt to influence their lives and
those of their children. What is to be feared most by the free society is
the blocking of avenues of persuasion, and, especially, monopolization
of persuasion by the state.
Because wants are learned, Galbraith claims they should not be ac-
corded any great weight; the desire to purchase in the marketplace
should not be tolerated because it is learned and not natural or inborn.
But those wants to which Galbraith wishes us to give more attention,
aesthetic desires and leisure, are just as learned. On what grounds do
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We credit Galbraith with superior knowledge of our needs? Beware the
intellectual who seeks power over our decisions and over the persuasion
to which we can respond, especially wyhen he seeks this power to prevent
us from doing what he thinks we should not desire to do.
Galbraith would have us believe that we are persuaded against our
self-interests to buy in the marketplace. He divines our more urgent
needs to be ballet and pretty buildings. He would have us assign to
government the task of insuring that we do not spend in the marketplace
as much as we now choose to spend. We are to be taxed in the name of
Aesthetics.
Let us consider the marketplace. In it we are exposed to a very large
variety of persuaders. Hawkers call our attention to the benefits of sav-
ing, to those of spending, to the purchase of art, comforts, education,
and appliances. The theaters beckon us. And the government is given
free press coverage to present its case. It is in the marketplace that we
fipc Galbraith's book. If we have no confidence in the responsibleness
of our decisions, when this great variety of options is revealed for our'
consideration, then how can we be confident of our decisions when we
ae adorned with blinders? The institutional arrangement that we call
the government confines us to fewer options and offers only greater con-
centration of control over persuasion. If we doubt our abilities to de-
cide in the marketplace, we must distrust ourselves even more in the
polling place where the options confronting us are fewer and more con-
trolled. It is in the polling place that we coerce the minority of voters
to abide by those persuasions that the majority finds acceptable. It is in
this sense that the meaningfulness of freedom is denied by the extreme
economic determinism of Galbraith, but it is we who will destroy free-
dom if we concur.
There are, without doubt, many activities that for practical purposes
can be performed best in Washington. Some coercion is inevitable and
pven desirable. Always, the political problem that must be faced when
consideration is given to extending government power, or, hopefully,
to reducing government power, is whether the gain is worth the cost.
This question is difficult to answer in many cases. Should we resort to
e draft to man our armed forces or should we rely on voluntary re-
cruitment? Should the policing power of the government be increased
or should we rely more exclusively on self-protection? Should the gov-
ernment build highways or should we rely on tolls? Should the govern-
ment produce education or merely subsidize the attendance of children
in private schools? But is the question difficult to answer in Galbraiths
case? Are we to resort to coercion because the marketplace cannot per-
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suade us to share fully Galbraith's taste for ballet? I cannot reply iny
better than by quoting Alexis de Tocqueville:
Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power,
which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications, and to
watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular,
provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent, if,
like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but
it seeks on the contrary to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is
well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of
nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government wil-
lingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only ar-
biter of that happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and
supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleaures, manages their
principal concerns, directs their indi4stry, regulates the descent of
property, and subdivides their inheritances-what remains, but to
spare them all care of thinking and all the trouble of living?10
?sycholanalysis, Psychiatry and Law. By Jay Katz, Joseph
o ldstein & Alan M. Dorshowitx. New York: The Free
Press, 1967, Pp. xxiii, 822. $17.50.
"The law" in Anglo-American thinking is a restricted concept. In
Civil Law systems, legal commentators mark the reach of this subject-
matter by all the legislation currently in force. Our tradition, however,
because of our reliance on case digests and advance sheets, creates new
categories and classifications only when there is appellate litigation. And
appellate litigation arises for the most part only when there are clients
financially able to litigate. As a result, judges, lawyers, and law schools
are blind to much of what is functionally law.
New areas become visible as "law" only as litigation increases, which
in turn occurs most frequently today when government undenrites
the expense of litigation, thus paradoxically subsidizing attacks on its
own processes. This evolution is notably evident in three fields: crim-
inal law, family law, and the law of the mentally ill. The first two areas
have been the object of seminal teaching materials produced primarily
at Yale Law School;' Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law pioneers the
third field.
10. 2 A. DE TOCQuEVnLLE, DEmoccY ni AnmE1IcA 338-39 (4th ed. H. Reeve transl.
1841).
1. R. DONNELLY, J. GOLuS & R. SC VART., .RibMnAL LVw (1g952; J. GaounsM &
J. KATZ, THE FAmLy ,N = LAw (1965).
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Litigation is certainly no new arrival in the field of substantive crim-
inal law, since most criminal standards took shape in the judge-made
common law. But criminal procedure until recently was a stepchild to
the substantive law, sketchily discussed in marginal books on local
practice and in afterthought sections of criminal law casebooks. It was
only when the Supreme Court demanded counsel for indigents2 and
when OEO and other organizations subsidized legal assistance, that any
substantial body of "law" emerged, and, incidentally, that law schools
began to recognize criminal procedure as a "glamor" subject. The
union of procedural law with the older substantive criminal law is
just beginning to spur challenges in areas that a decade ago were totally
beyond the ken of the digesters-the sentencing process, probation and
parole revocation, prison discipline, and the punishment of alcoholics
and drug addicts.3
Family law is undergoing a similar expansion. There is a substantial
body of case law, but it concerns for the most part either the property
and contract aspects of marriage, or the custody of children whose
sundered parents can afford the luxury of litigating a child's future.
With the advent of neighborhood legal centers and other sources of
legal assistance for the poor, however, the picture has begun to change.
A significant part of a typical legal aid bureau's civil business is matri-
monial and family litigation. As these cases move into court, moreover,
the policies and practices of governmental and quasi-governmental
organizations administering public welfare funds have for the first time
begun to engage the attention of the courts. The result is an emerging
field of welfare law, comprehending matters like the administrative
powers of agency workers over their clients,4 the relation between
public welfare schedules and support payments after divorce or judicial
separation, the rights and obligations of welfare tenants in public and
"slumlord" housing, and the legal protection of lower income con-
sumers.
In contrast, the law of the mentally ill is almost virgin territory. This
is not to say that there is nothing on which to construct a body of legal
doctrine. Legislation is found in every state, most of it more than two
2. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 853 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (addiction); Easter v. District of Colum-
bia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcoholism); Driver v. Hunant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966) (alcoholism). The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in an alcoholic
case, Powell v. Texas, 389 U.S. 810 (1967).
4. Cf. the administrative search cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 887 U.S. 523 (1967),
and See v. Seattle, 887 U.S. 541 (1967).
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generations old, delineating the power of the state to segregate those
whose mental condition is viewed as sufficiently aberrant to make them
"dangerous."5 There is also scattered case law, though until recently it
related primarily to two problems: the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion, and the property rights and liabilities of those characterized as
mentally ill. The first line of cases uncritically upheld the legislation
under the parens patriae power of the state; the latter affected only the
handful of mental hospital inmates with enough property to attract
claimants. The subterranean rumblings, however, suggest that the
eruptions in criminal procedure, family law and welfare administration
will soon be duplicated in the law of the mentally ill.
Two recent decisions signal this trend. Baxstrom v. Herald held that,
when judicial action is required for other civil commitments, a convict
cannot be civilly committed by administrative fiat at the expiration
of his maximum term without denying him equal protection of the
laws. The second is In re Gault,7 which imposed for the first time due
process requirements on juvenile proceedings "which may result in
commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is cur-
tailed."s
The Supreme Court noted in Gault that due process had taken an
extended holiday from the juvenile courts because the substantive law
applied was viewed as an exercise of the parens patriae power to help,
not punish, the child, thereby justifying informal civil procedures
rather than the safeguards of a criminal trial. But the Court placed
reality over promise and concluded that the rehabilitative ideal has
not been achieved in fact. The rate of recidivism is high. Nor is a
juvenile protected during his adult life by not having been called a
"criminal"; the term "delinquent" carries a similar stigma and produces
the same sort of job apd social discrimination as the label "criminal."
In short, "[f]ailure to observe the fundamental requirements of due
process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of
unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of
fact, and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy."0
5. State legislation is summarized in A mmucAsN BAR FouNA-'o.v, THE Mrwmx. DIs-
ABLED .Aa' THE LAw 15-106 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
LINDMAN 8- MCINTE].
6. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The case and its forerunners and its aftermath are covered at
pp. 694-707 of KAz, Goos-r. , & DEmHowrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PS YCIlAMw, AND LAW
(1967) [hereinafter cited as PSYCOANALYSIS, PsYc-ATRY AND LA'.
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Id. at 41.
9. Id. at 19-20.
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The Court therefore laid down new requirements: advance written
iotice of charges' to permit adequate preparation. the right to counsel,
including assigned counsel; the right to confront and cross-examine wit-
riesses; observance of the privilege against self-incriliination at all stages
of the process. 0
Gault will produce sweeping changes in juvenile coutt practice. The
Court's pointed warning that at some time and in some dourt a record
must be reconstructed of what happened during the delinquency hear-
ings will inevitably force juvenile courts to keep transcripts. If state
procedures do not offer adequate review of juvenile court actions,
federal district courts will quickly determine that there are no state
remedies to be exhausted, and review through habeas corpus. Juvenile
codes Will have to be rewritten to distinguish dearly among preliminary
hearings, waiver hearings to tratisfei- the juvenile to ah adult criminal
court, adjudication, and disposition. The right to counsel will spill
over into all these areas, and some day may readi juvenile court pro-
ceedings in neglect and custody cases. The notice requirements will
bring into immediate focus the vague and indefinite statutory language
defining delinquency or authorizing juvenile court intervention in
family affairs. This is but a sampling of the questions certain to be
litigated as a result of Gault's deceptively simple due process reqtlire-
ments.
Chapter II of, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law shows that the
practices condemned in Gault exist, if anything in exaggerated form,
under ldgislation authorizing compulsory commitment of the mentally
ill. Take, for example, the matter of legislative standards for commit-
ment. Statutes in the great majority of states require the existence of
mental illness, mental deficiency or epilepsy. These terms, however,
are rarely defined; where yesterday's legislature has tried to follow the
medical "forms of actioh," the statutory language no longer corresponds
to modem usage.'0 There must be something more than illness, how-
ever, to justify commitment. The usual standard is danger to the person
or property of others or danger to the safety of the person to be com-
mitted. This combined purpose to protect the community from harmful
acts and to safeguard the person himself from self-inflicted harm, has
generally sufficed to rebuff constitutional attacks on commitment
statutes.'" But many laws also turn on the fact that the person is in
need of treatment. While this aspect of the statutes has also usually been
10. Cf. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.844 (Supp. 1965).
11. Authorities are gathered at PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 596-66.
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sustained, though reluctantly,'- there is no dear explanation why
detention should be possible where it benefits the detainee but not the
community, since in other contexts the protection of the community
has been viewed as the only adequate constitutional justification."
3 In
sum, involuntary civil commitment is an ill-defined and essentially un-
circumscribed invocation of the pa-ens patriae power comparable to
that in juvenile codes.
The fruit of this vague legislation is indeterminate detention often
imposed without the due process of law that Gault now demands for
juvenile delinquency proceedings. This is made dear in the records
of three cases that the authors, following the felicitous precedent of
the earlier volumes on criminal and family law, present under the
pseudonyms of Bertha Radek,14 Bong Yol Yang'8 and Tony Savarese."0
Notice of the proceedings may be withheld from the person to be com-
mitted, on the ground that it would be detrimental to his health or
disruptive of treatment. 7 When given, notice is generally in the con-
clusory terms of the statute itself. No state prohibits representation by
counsel, but in only a third is appointment of counsel for an indigent
required, and compensation for the attorney is seldom specifically
authorized.?s As a result most respondents are unrepresented, and the
lucky few receive for the most part only perfunctory advocacy-worse,
if that is possible, than that provided indigent criminal defendants
under a system of randomly assigned, uncompensated counsel. The only
means to obtain data about the indigent respondent's mental condition
is a diagnostic commitment for observation,' 0 but this is not under the
control of respondent's counsel and there is in general no requirement
that the state underwrite independent mental examinations by private
psychiatrists. A hearing must usually be held, but in only a minority
of states does the committee have the statutory right to be present.-9
The hearing itself is brief and the evidence is largely hearsay; the
respondent himself may well be examined by the court if he attends.
Appeal is possible in the abstract, but is often in the form of a de novo
12. See Lake v. Cameron, 864 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 331 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
in PsYcHOANALYsIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 552-54, 710-13.
13. See In re Brooks Estate, 32 1M. 2d 361, 205 N.E2d 435 (1965), PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PsycikTRY AND IAw 558-60.
14. PSYcHOmiALYSIs, PsycH, TRY Am LAW 423-59.
15. Id. at 493-99.
16. Id. at 634-50. This is an incompetency to stand trial case, but the due process issues
it raises are substantially identical to those in regular civil commitments.
17. See L u'hAN & AfcINTYRE 25.
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proceeding in another court of general jurisdiction which duplicates
the shortcomings of the first. In short, by the yardstick of Gault, the
overwhelming majority of civil commitment proceedings lack funda-
mental due process.
If the commitment process is loose and constitutionally suspect, the
process of return to the community is even more suspect because it is
for the most part invisible. Discharge is largely a matter of administra-
tive convenience; the tests applied seldom have any observable rela-
tionship to the criteria that the legislature originally established for
commitment.21 Many statutes provide in form for judicial supervision
of the process, 22 but this review almost always follows an administrative
decision to release; if the court intervenes it is to insist that the inmate
be kept in custody. Since release procedures are almost always ex parte,
however, nobody appears to advocate continued commitment; the court
merely rubberstamps the administrative decision. If discharge is denied,
habeas corpus is available in theory to test the propriety of continued
custody and has in fact been the medium through which most existing
case law has been established. But habeas corpus litigation is possible
only when the inmate has friends or family willing and able to under.
write the proceedings, or when commitment resulted from a criminal
prosecution so that the right to appointed counsel spins off to the habeas
proceeding as well. For the most part, indigent patients pass their
years and decades of incarceration docilely, unable to secure review on
their own initiative and unprotected by any enforced statutory require-
ment of periodic review by a court or agency outside the hospital walls.
Demands for a measure of due process will meet the same claims
advanced against efforts to bring juvenile procedures within the Con-
stitution-that a considerable erosion of the traditional criminal or
even civil procedural safeguards is necessary in order to protect the
therapeutic goals of the process. Gault repudiated this argument in the
juvenile delinquency setting. But the Court in Gault also expressed
doubt that the therapeutic ideal was being achieved-or even vigorously
pursued-in any significant way. Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law
provides ample evidence that, notwithstanding any beneficent aims,
mental health procedures have led to a mere warehousing of social
misfits. Empirical studies have shown for example that the world of a
21. See, e.g., the transcript of proceedings in Rouse v. Cameron, PsycloANALYsts, Ps '
CHATRY AND LAw 603-11. The decision concerned release after commitment based on an
acquittal by reason of insanity, but release procedure tends to be the same whatever the
original legal basis for commitment.
22. LINDMNAN & MCINTYRE 128-29.
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mental institution inmate differs in no significant way from that of a
prison inmate.2 3 Indeed, a prison is more often than not superior to a
mental hospital in terms of living conditions and opportunity for work
and recreation.24 Moreover, a prison inmate with anything but a
mandatory life sentence can look forward to a definite time by which
he must be discharged; even a life convict has the near certainty that
after some period his case will be laid before the governor for possible
commutation or pardon. But a hospital inmate has no such assurance.
Underlying the parens patriae approach has been the assumption that
patients will receive therapy. In fact, however, there is no treatment in
the great majority of public hospitals. Staff strength is inadequate, and
salary levels are so low that most state mental health personnel have
only marginal professional qualifications. The punitive use of electro-
shock and insulin shock treatment25 has given way to tranquilizers,
which are of some treatment value, but which may frequently be
administered, one suspects, to produce placid but essentially unchanged
inmates. Many inmates are elderly persons cast off by families and
society alike, kept in hospitals and asylums simply because American
society, in unfortunate contrast to a majority of cultures, refuses to
shoulder responsibility for the old. In short, procedures essentially un-
controlled by due process of law have consigned hundreds of thousands
of Americans to a bleak incarceration terminated only by death. And
if by chance release occurs while an inmate is still capable of leading
a productive life, he meets ostracism against him as one who was "in-
sane" that is in many respects more virulent than if he were "criminal"
or "delinquent."
The legislative and judicial conscience at work in criminal law and
family law will probably begin to function soon in mental health law,
despite the widespread popular fear of those who are or appear to be
abnormal. We can anticipate constitutional decisions and gradual
legislative reform. But new decisions and amended statutes at best
provide only an opportunity for reform. True reform is possible only
when lawyers and judges know the legal objectives of commitment and
instinctively sense what is procedurally fair. Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry
and Law provides an excellent medium for training law students in a
legal specialty about to be born. But this in itself is only a start. For
23. PsYCHOANA.LYsIs, PSYCHATRY AND IAw 650-69.
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"law" is only a third of the book's title, and statute and case law is
only partially controlled by lawyers. Unless doctors and hospital ad-
ministrators understand the scope and function of mental health legis-
lation and are trained in their roles in mental health administration,
reforms will quickly come to naught.
The State of Michigan offers a laboratory model of the problem.
In 1966 the Michigan Legislature enacted several statutes affecting the
mentally ill involved in criminal proceedings. It revamped in a unique
manner the statutes governing commitment of those incompetent to
stand trial.26 Under the new law, upon a showing sufficient to raise in-
competence to stand trial at the clue process level, 27 the trial court must
commit the defendant to a newly established center for forensic psy-
chiatry, which reports his mental condition to the court. The court
then holds a hearing on the issue of competency, with emphasis not on
diagnostic categories but on symptomatology that suggests non-triabiltty.
If the defendant is found incompetent, he is committed for an initial
18-month period as a regular civil committee. If by then he has not
improved to the degree that he can be tried, notice to that effect and a
detailed psychiatric report go to the probate court, which must hold the
equivalent of a regular civil commitment proceeding. If the probate
court refuses to commit, the case goes back to the original trial court,
which holds its own hearing to determine whether the defendant is
competent. If it finds he is, he is tried; if it concludes he is not, this
finding in effect reverses the probate court's denial of commitment, and
the defendant is committed as a regular mental health inmate and
furloughed or discharged on that basis. Some protection against delayed
prosecution and punishment is provided by allowing the statute of
limitations to rtn throughout the period of institutionalization and
by crediting all time spent in the hospital against any sentence of
imprisonment ultimately imposed. In short, the new law is intended
to end the Michigan practices that were previously exactly like those
desbribed in the, Tony Savarese case in Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and
Law. 2S
But substantial progress will require hard work. A series of judicial
conferences has helped to explain the functioning of the statute to
26. MICH. STAT. AN. § 28.966(11) (Supp. 1967), Mic. COMp. LAws § 767.27a, licic.
Pun. & LOCAL ACrs oF 1966, Pun. Acr No. 266. The legislation is described In detail In
George, Michigan's New Mental Health Legislation for Criminal Cases, 46 Micr. Sr. B.J.,
Feb., 1967, at 13. See also PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW.v 566-93.
27. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
28. PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 634-49.
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trial judges, and some attorneys are beginning to practice comfortably
under the new statute. The chief difficulty, however, is to train com-
petent medical personnel to serve as diagnosticians and witnesses. Staff
doctors in mental hospitals have long emphasized diagnostic classifica-
tion of mental cases over a functional analysis in terms of symptoms, and
have tended to play the game of equating, for example, "schizophrenia,"
but not "sociopathic personality," with "insanity" or "mental disease or
defect." Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law provides many depressing
examples29 of what occurs with discouraging frequency in every state.
Despite efforts to insist on diagnostic reports that describe the patient's
condition in detail, leaving it to the court to decide whether this
condition suggests non-triability, the same old patterns of diagnosis
and testimony continue to appear in the reports to and testimony before
Michigan courts.
The obvious lesson is that changes in mental health statutes or new
interpretive decisions by state or federal courts will mean little as long
as doctors and hospital administrators are left free to clothe legal and
social judgments in medical or pseudo-medical terms without fear of
effective cross-examination. The best antidote is a new generation of
lawyers who not only grasp what statutes relating to mental condition
are intended to accomplish, but also know enough psychiatric theory
to recognize who is a qualified psychiatric examiner and who is not,
what is a scientifically valid diagnosis and what is not, and what is
expert testimony and what merely legal conclusions disguised as expert
opinion. Such lawyers can in effect educate qualified experts in the
courtroom roles they are to play. The foundations for this expertise
must be laid as a part of undergraduate legal education. Chapter I of
Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law becomes relevant here. After a
brief section suggesting that lawyers and psychiatrists alike rely upon a
concept, though not necesarily the same concept, of what and why
man is, and that this concept must be inquired into before dialogue is
possible, the editors offer basic materials on psychiatric theories of the
unconscious, the id, the ego, the superego and the total personality,
drawn primarily from Freudian sources. After each body of psychiatric
materials, cases and statutes on which psychiatric theory bears are
arrayed for discussion and contemplation. To utilize Chapter I to maxi-
mum advantage would require joint teaching by a psychiatrist and a
lawyer, a point the editors make clear in the preface. However, the
materials are selected and arranged carefully enough that if a course
29. E.g., PSYcHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AD LAIW 494-95, 539-40, 575-79, 602, 603-11.
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were based on Chapter II ("Law and Psychiatry"), students could
derive enough from Chapter I ("Psychoanalysis and Law,") that they
should be required to study it on their own initiative. To this extent,
a law teacher with at least some theoretical knowledge of psychiatric
principles can himself offer a course that goes far toward laying the
foundation for an intelligent, effective practice of law involving mental
health questions. The availability of Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and
Law indeed makes it feasible for the first time for law schools to offer
an effective course or seminar on the law of mental health even though
they cannot afford the luxuries of interdisciplinary appointments or
the preparation of materials to meet local staff interests and needs.
In the final analysis, however, efforts by lawyers, however competent
and alert they may be, to educate medical practitioners in the aims of
the legal system and a doctor's role in effectuating them will come too
late to be of maximum effect. Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law ought
also to be the basis of a required course in medical schools, replacing
the usual lectures on the tort liability of medical practitioners that
commonly masquerade as a course on "medical jurisprudence." The
impact would be heightened if both law students and medical students
attended the same class or seminar, because each group should learn
as early as possible how the other group of incipient professionals thinks
and reacts. Dr. Andrew Watson, Professor E. Donald Shapiro and I have
done this with law and social work students, and we have been pleas.
antly surprised at the cross-education the students themselves provide,
Cross-fertilization is even more important for medicine and law.
In sum, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law completes a trilogy that
should set a trend in legal education; it ought also to be promoted as a
first step toward coordination and partial integration of medical and
legal education.
B. J. GEORGE, JR.t
f Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1949, J.D. 1951, University of Mich.
igan.
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The New Draft Law, A Manual for Lawyers and Coun-
selors. By Ann Fagan Ginger. Berkeley: The National
Lawyers Guild, 1967. Pp. 135. $10.00. Student Ed. $5.00.
The Military Selective Service Act of 19671 is one of those rare stat-
utes2 which is so utterly rotten at its core and in every branch, root and
leaf, that the only appropriate remedy is clean extirpation from the law
of the land 3 In such circumstances the literally radical is also the au-
thentically conservative. Unfortunately, our judges are neither bold nor
courageous when evil comes full-blown.4 We will have to put up with
the sort of "moderation" which lets the sickness corrupt our constitu-
tion further,5 fearing the temporary pain of a short, sharp shock. The
treatment of the Dutch Elm Disease by picking off dead leaves one by
one-trimming a dead branch here and shoring up a dying trunk there
-this is part of the great heritage "liberalism" has left us; and our
judges are, of course, mostly in the "mainstream.""
So we shall have to niggle and nibble where the knife is needed. In
the last few months, the growing interest in Selective Service lawyering
has been striking and encouraging. At Yale, we shall have a Selective
1. 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 451-573 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967).
2. The dismal swamp of the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the
Communist Control Act of 1954 is probably another.
3. This is not the place to probe all the interconnected pockets of corruption-it is
enough to suggest a few:
(1) Peacetime conscription is involuntary servitude, an unequal tax, and a taking of
property (i.e., the earning power of one's free labor) without just compensation-and it
should be remembered that the Supreme Court has never held the contrary. Cf. Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), discussed in Bernstein, Conscription and the Con-
stitution, 53 A.B.A.J. 708 (1967).
(2) The system of classification denies equal protection and establishes religion. Cf.
Clancy & Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clarity
and Constitutional Considerations, 17 MMANE L. Rnv. 143 (1955).
(3) The congressional effort to forestall judidal review (see pp. 45 infira) is unconsti-
tutional. See generally H. HART & H. WVEcHsLER, Tim FEDERAL COUM AND TuE FEDERAL
SYsTEm 323-25 (1953) (which, however, does not push its analysis of Falbo v. United States,
320 U.S. 549 (1944), and Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), far enough).
(4) The draft card possession requirement (if authorized by the statute) serves no
proper governmental purpose whatsoever, and is an instrument of symbolic repression.
Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.. 624 (1943).
(5) The draft system denies the individual the right to decide not to commit war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.. 972 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). But cf. NIoAT AION AmisoR" Comm'N
ON SELcrvE SERvicE, IN PuRsurr OF EqUrrv: WHO Srnvzs WiMN NOT ALL SEnvE 50-51
(1967), which considers this denial of free moral choice a great virtue of the systeml
4. But see Mora v. McNamara, 36 U.S.L.W. 3189 (US. Nov. 6, 1967) (Stewart &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
5. For example, see the National Commission's suggestion that the draft system be sed
as a vehicle for universal testing of the male population. NATioNAL Aasoan" Co sotr,
supra note 3, at 6, 39, 58. The Commission thought, however, that there wias a "lack of a
constitutional basis in any program of universal compulsory service." Id. 61.
6. It is only fair to concede that the bar has done a miserable job of presenting the
problem-in fact, it has abdicated any responsibility at all in the area, until recently.
827
The Yale Law Journal
Service research seminar this Spring and similar projects are underway
elsewhere. The ACLU recently sponsored an all-day draft law seminar
for practitioners. A Selective Service Law Reporter wqs born just the
other day, and-given funding and luck-will be in operation within a
few months, combining a loose-leaf service, a treatise, a law review, and
a practice manual all in one. The SSLR will meet a desperate need, but
so far it is little more than a hope and a promise. For immediate pur-
poses, the draft-law practitioner has to rely on the Government Printing
OfficeT for new Regulations and Local Board Memoranda, and on the
Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, the National Lawyers
Guild, the ACLU and a few other organizations for memoranda, cur-
rent information and the like.
Into this hopeless labyrinth-compounded by the currency of rumor,
misinformation, and dubious tips-Ann Fagan Ginger" has come,
promising, like Ariadne, a thread. The conception, the effort, and the
speed9 are certainly to be commended. Such a Manual for Lawyers and
Counselors is exactly what is needed, at least until the SSLR is on its
feet. But I would hate to play Theseus to Ann Fagan Ginger's Ariadne,
for what looks like a ball of sturdy yarn turns out to be an old-fashioned
string collection: a lot of snippets rolled up together, some of them
good pieces, some irredeemably knotted and snarled-not at all the
true thread it appears to be.
It is hard to criticize, when the need is so great and the intention so
good, Intentions-as often happens-are not enough, and particularly
so when men's freedom and even lives depends upon the care and skill
with which they are represented. They are entitled to the hard-headed-
ness (if not the cold-heartedness) that Cravath, Swaine & Moore would
give to a tax case-and to a lot more imaginativeness on top of that, In
this spirit, I think that in all honesty as a reviewer, I am bound to say
that I think the Manual is almost worse than useless. It could be a posi-
tive danger. Any counselor or lawyer who counts on the Manual courts
disaster.'0
7. The GPO is fantastically slow. On October 23, 1967, Local Ioard Memo No. 84-
relating to student deferments under he new Act-was issued by Selective Servlcc.
Although I have a "continuing subscription" to these Memoranda, I have yet to receive
No. 84. (As this was going to press, GPO finally produced. Jan. 26, 1968.)
8. A. GINGER, Tm NEW DRAFT LAW, A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AIND COUNSELORS (1167)
[hereinafter cited as IAArjUAL].
9. The Manual came out within a few months of the new Act and Regulations.
10. In fairness, the Manual does list the "indispensable tools" of counselling on page
2-including the Act, the Regulations, the Local Board Memoranda, and the Hadbook4
fer CoMcientious Objecrs (Philadelphia, 1967) put out by the Central Committee for
Cpscientiqus Objectors.
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A very few illustrations will suffice. First, the Manual purports to
contain the "Military Selective Service Act of 1967: full text."'n The
literal claim is true, but the implied claim-that a usable "full text" of
a statute is set forth-is not. Only the 1967 amendments are reproduced
(e.g., "(3) Section 5(a) (50 App, U.S.C. 456(a)) is amended by inserting
'(1)' immediately after 'Sec: 5(a)'; and by adding at the end thereof a
new paragraph as follows: ... ."). These, of course, are utterly useless
by themselves. Similarly, the Manual sets forth a Taumber of critical
Regulations, but gives only the recent amendments.
Second, the Manual gives virtually no references to the materials a
lawyer or counselor would need. Very few cases are cited, 2 let alone
discussed; practically no secondary materials are even cited.
Third, the Manual abounds in serious booby-traps.13 For example,
on page 97 it suggests that since the judicially developed technical re-
quirements for exhaustion-of-remedies (prerequisite to raising misclas-
sification as a defense to a criminal charge of refusing induction)-
namely, that the registrant report for induction but refuse to step
forward (submit)-was based upon the availability of administrative
remedies at the induction center which no longer exist, the technical
requirement of reporting could now be challenged. An interesting ar-
gument. What it fails to take account of, however, is the fact that the
1967 Act has codified the old judicial rule: "No judicial review shall be
made of the classification... of any registrant... except as a defense to
a criminal prosecution ... after the registrant has responded either af-
firmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction .... ,,14 Of
course this is inartfully written-like the whole rest of the draft law-
and is consequently ambiguous. Maybe exhaustion is satisfied by refus-
ing to report, not (as in the past) by reporting but refusing to submit.
The legislative history is to the contrary-congressmen apparently
though they were codifying (even tightening) the judiciary's rule.15 At
11. MANUAL 14-15.
12. An exception: on page 96-as "Points & Authorities" in support of a form "Com-
plaint for Declaratory Judgment, Mandamus, Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order,
& Convening of Three-Judge Court'-the Manual 1'[s]uggest[s] using and Shepardizing"
four cases.
13. It is also rife with trivial mistakes-perhaps justified by haste.
14. 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 460(b)(3)(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
15. H.R. Rae. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, 7, 30-31 (1967); cf. Note, 81 HALy. L. RE%.
685 (1967), which shows that there are serious constitutional problems if Section 10(b)(3)
is read to bar suits like Wolff v. Locg Bd. No, 16, 322 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
Since the legislative history reveals-in 'addition to hostility to Wolff (which could le
viewed as based upon the factor of pre-exhaustion relief, not the factor of pre-report-
for-induction relief)-an intent to podify the existing law, one can certainly argue force-
fully that it was codified with ifs establishe4 exceptions. Compare judicial treatment of
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all events, the lawyer who relies on the Manual's theory may be in seri-
ous trouble. In another place, the Manual suggests that the draft vio-
lates the thirteenth amendment (a proposition with which-given ap-
propriate qualification-I think I agree) without mentioning the fact
that at least for wartime draft the Supreme Court has held to the con-
trary.1 6
Fourth, the Manual is full of what probably is bad advice-for exam-
ple, it suggests that a CO applicant interrogate his draft board,17 asking
"each board member individually" if he has read the registrant's CO
form and supporting material, asking the board how it has treated other
CO applicants and how it decides CO cases, whether it has read the ap-
plicable Regulations, whether it is prejudiced against him for racial,
personal, or political reasons, and how it defines the critical phrases in
the definition of a CO. I cannot imagine that this would be welcomed
by the average board, though it might, as the Manual seems to have in
mind, lay the foundation for some kind of litigation.1 8 The techniqueg
and prospects of such litigation-and whether the risk is a sensible one
-receive no attention.
Fifth, some critical problems are left unmentioned-a form com-
plaint for a federal civil action on page 91, for example, asserts the juris-
dictional amount but the Manual does not indicate how it could be
made out.19
Finally, the Manual sets forth a variety of very suggestive arguments
a practitioner might use, but presents them in so thin and even crude a
28 U.S.C. § 2254, which codified the exhaustion.of-state-remedies requirement in federal
habeas corpus, in cases such as Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Congress seems to be incapable of using words with a technical meaning in selective
service law in a manner consistent with that meaning. The same word, "report," which
causes the trouble in Section 460(b)(3) also appears in Section 454(a): "any registrant who
has failed or refused to report for induction shall continue to remain liable . .. ."
(emphasis added). Probably what Congress meant to say was "failed or refused to submit
to induction," and there is no reason to suppose that the person who reports but refuses
to step forward was meant to be exempted. But whatever Congress may have meant, what
the statute says is "report." I would argue that, particularly as this is a penal statute,
and since Congress has twice used a technical word with an established meaning in the
same way (so that neither use, presumably, is a mistake), both sections should be read to
mean what they dearly say. Therefore Section 460(b)(3) changes the exhaustion rule, no
longer requiring that a registrant report; and Section 454(a) extends the liability for
induction only of those registrants who do not report.
16. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
17. MANUAL 59. Of course, he "should appear to be what he is: ignorant of the law,
but curious." Id.
18. Elsewhere the Manual waxes enthusiastic about the uses of pretrial discovery to
find out how a local board treats its cases, without noting that the case upon which this
idea is based was-despite its having turned up a lot of juicy information-lost. Id. 100.
See Margolis, Trying a Case under the Selective Service Law, 26 GUILD PRAC1rrION4E 100
(1967).
19. The problem of showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 is a real
one. See Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967).
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form that-if actually used in such a state-they would serve, I fear, not
to persuade but to antagonize most judges. An extreme example makes
the point-after quoting the Marshall Commission Report and Presi-
dent Johnson to the effect that Negroes and those who do not go to
graduate school are somewhat overrepresented in the armed forces (and
omitting to note any of the reasons, inadequate as they may be, that the
Commission gave to explain the fact), the Manual observes point-blank:
These facts, taken together, present a clear case of denial of
equal protection. This registrant raises this as a defense against his
refusal of induction because he contends that his order of induc-
tion was based on a rejection of his appeal from a 1-A classification
which he would have not received if he had lived an equal life with
white registrants."
Immediately after this statement, which apparently is addressed to a
judge, the Manual sets forth "Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction
No. _" This reads as follows:
If you find that the order to report for induction, or defendant's
1-A classification, resulted, directly or indirectly, from (a) defen-
dant's poverty, or (b) poverty due to his race, or (c) his failure to be
in school due to poverty, or (d) his failure to remain in school due
to poverty, or (e) financial straits of his family, you are instructed
to find the defendant not guilty.
Set against the difficulties and subtleties of making out an equal protec-
tion claim, the Manual's offering is just plain silly. What the practi-
tioner needs is some detailed advice about how to allege and prove a
claim that has some chance to win.
The Manual is not without usefulness-if treated sceptically, and
only as an addition to the essential tools. One could even recommend it
to the practitioner who has already subscribed to the Regulations ($5),
the Local Board Memoranda ($4), and the Handbook for Conscientious
Objectors ($1) . . . except for its price: $10 (this for 139 offset pages
glued into a paper cover-the pages being mere reprints of a Supple-
ment to the Guild's Civil Rights & Liberties Handbook).21 At such an
extravagant price, its usefulness is so marginal that almost anyone's
money would be better spent elsewhere.
JoHN GXmrrlt
20. MANUAL 77.
21. According to a letter from the Guild, a student edition of the fanual is aailable
for $5.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B. 1952, University of California




Associate Dean and Professor of Law 1954-1968
With the death of Dean 'late. the Law School has lost an able adminis-
trator and a ltreasured friend. As chairman of the admissions committee.
he brought to New Haven an increasingly varied and talented student
body; once here, students found him an interested and sympathetic count-
selor. His sudden passing has underscored the intensity of his deotiont to
the school and its work.

